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Abstract
Rajkumar and Swaroop examine  the role of  governance, public spending on primary education
governance-measured  by  level of corruption and quality  becomes effective  in increasing  primary education
of bureaucracy-and  ask how it affects the relationship  attainment.  These findings have important implications
between public spending and outcomes.  Their main  for enhancing the development  effectiveness of public
innovation  is to see if differences  in efficacy  of public  spending. The lessons are particularly relevant  for
spending can  be explained  by quality of governance.  The  developing countries,  where public spending on
authors find that public health spending lowers child and  education  and health is relatively low, and the state  of
infant mortality  rates in countries with good governance.  governance  is often poor.
The results also indicate that as countries improve their
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World Bank.1.  Introduction
The role of good governance has been emphasized in recent years as a key to
development  effectiveness.  For example, it has been argued that merely allocating public
resources for right goods and services may not lead to desirable outcomes if budget institutions-
involving planning, management, and execution-are malfunctioning (World Bank 1998). While
this proposition  seems pretty straightforward and difficult to disagree with, no serious empirical
work has been carried out to support it. In this paper, we study the impact of public spending on
outcomes at different levels of governance.1 The basic idea is to examine the link between
specific budget allocations and outcomes,  and see how these relationships are affected with
improved governance.
A number of  past studies (see Section 2 for references)  have looked at the link between
public spending and outcomes  (e.g., impact of public spending on economic growth or on other
outcomes such as health status or education attainment).  In cases where public spending is found
to have low or negligible impact, two explanations are given: First, it is argued that the link
between public spending and development outcomes could be severed because an increase  in
public provision could lead to a "crowding out" of provision by the private sector. This line of
reasoning does not question the efficacy of public spending per se; instead, it contends that due to
substitution by public for private spending,  additional public provision in many cases has a
negligible net marginal effect. The second set of possible reasons for the ineffectiveness of public
spending includes poor targeting and/or institutional inefficiencies  such as leakage in public
spending and weak institutional capacity.
In providing assistance to developing countries, a common approach adopted by most
donor agencies is to ask for increases in budgetary allocation for programs on education and
health.  While in most cases this may be necessary,  it is certainly not, by itself, sufficient to ensure
enhancement or improvement in actual service delivery.  Bad budget management has frequently
been cited as one of the main reasons why governments in developing  countries find it difficult
to translate public spending into effective services (World Bank 1998). Characteristics of a
According to World Bank (1994) "Good govemance  is epitomized by predictable,  open, and enlightened policy making (that is,
transparent processes);  a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions;
and a strong civil society participating in public affairs;  and all behaving under the rule of law.
Ipublic expenditure management system that contribute to the effectiveness of service delivery
and lead to better outcomes include: (a) a comprehensive  and properly approved budget; (b)
internal control mechanisms  (including well-functioning and transparent financial management
and procurement systems) to ensure that funds are spent as intended; and (c) regular and timely
reports to the legislature on actual expenditure in comparison to budgeted amounts. In the
absence of such a system, public funds are likely to be wasted and/or misappropriated.  A
reasonable proposition, therefore, can be made: Managing public resources  to promote
development requires well-trained,  skillful personnel, working in an institutional setting with an
incentive  system to reduce fraud and promote cost efficiency.  The main objective of this research
is to empirically examine a testable version of this proposition.  More specifically, we address the
following three questions:
1.  How effective is public spending in improving social indicators such as infant mortality?
Could public resources help achieve better education outcomes?
2.  What is the contribution of a public expenditure management system that promotes cost
efficiency by reducing corruption in enhancing the link between public spending and
social outcomes?
3.  How important is the public sector's institutional capacity-in particular, human
resources-in providing effective services that lead to better development outcomes?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief review of
the links between public spending and development outcomes that have been studied in the past.
This section also provides the motivation behind our research. Section 3 describes a model that
gives us estimable equations. In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss our experiments  with institutional
variables that affect the spending-outcome  link in health and education sectors, respectively.
Section 6 presents our concluding remarks.
2.  Public Spending and Outcomes:  What Do We Know?
There is a fair amount of research on the relationship between public spending and
outcomes. The research on endogenous  growth in the 1990s has produced several models linking
public spending with the economy's  long-term growth. Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990,  1991),
Levine and Renelt (1992) Easterly and Rebelo (1993), and Devarajan,  Swaroop, and Zou (1996),
among others, have studied the relationship between public spending and economic  growth. A
2number of these studies find conflicting results regarding the growth impact of different types of
sectoral spending. For example, Easterly and Rebelo (1993)  show that public investments in
transport and communication in developing countries is positively correlated with growth, with a
very high coefficient.  On the other hand, using data from 43 developing countries over 20 years
Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) find that capital spending-in particular, public
investments in transport and communication-has  a negative correlation with per-capita real
GDP growth.
In addition to the work on the relationship between public spending and economic
growth, many researchers have examined the link between sectoral public spending (mostly in
the health and education sectors) and outcomes in those sectors. For example, Harbison  and
Hanushek (1992) examined  12 studies on developing countries that look at the association
between public education spending and educational outcomes.  Six of these studies report a
statistically significant positive relationship between the two; others found no evidence of any
measurable impact of spending on outcomes.  Elley (1992), Hanushek (1995), Mingat and Tan
(1992,  1998) also find that that there is little if any relationship between public education
spending and educational outcomes. Using cross-section data-1994 data for 50 developing and
transition countries-Gupta,  Verhoeven, and Tiongson (1999) find that primary health care
spending is positively associated with child and infant mortality rates.  In an earlier study, Bidani
and Ravallion (1997) looked at 35 developing countries in 1990 and found a positive effect of
public health spending on outcomes such as life expectancy and infant mortality rates. Filmer and
Pritchett (1999) provide a good survey of studies linking public spending with health outcomes.
In their own work, they find that the two are very tenuously related. According to their results,
doubling public spending from 3 to 6 percent of GDP would improve child mortality by only 9 to
13 percent.
What do these weak links between public spending and development outcomes indicate?
Does it mean that these governments (mostly in developing countries) are spending on
unproductive activities? Should they not be spending on education and health?  Generally, it is
difficult to draw such policy conclusions from cross-country data, as much depends upon the
country specific situation. However, it is possible that these studies do not shed light on the
"true" relationship between public spending and development outcomes. The link between public
3spending and desirable outcomes may, in practice, be severed when there is no incentive
mechanism in the public sector to use available funds for productive purposes. In explaining the
negative link between capital  spending and per capita growth, Devarajan,  Swaroop, and Zou
(1996) note that this may reflect a problem in the link between public spending and service
delivery. They argue that while public capital stocks in developing countries have been shown to
be associated with economic  growth, it may be the case that public spending-as measured from
budget documents of countries-does not create any productive  capital.
Surveying the literature on the link between public spending and outcomes, Pritchett
(1996) notes that all of the negative or ambivalent findings on public spending could potentially
be a reflection of differences in the efficacy of spending. These differences could arise due to a
variety of reasons including corruption and patronage, and need not necessarily be attributed to
bad economic policy. In other words, a unit's worth of public spending does not necessarily buy a
unit's worth of service.  A good example supporting this theory comes from a public expenditure
tracking survey done in Uganda, a poor Sub-Saharan African country. In a survey of 250 primary
schools in Uganda, Ablo and Reinikka (1998)  found that on average these schools received only
13 percent of the budgetary allocation for non-wage expenditures;  the remaining amount-en
route from the finance ministry to the facilities-either disappeared or was used for purposes
unrelated to primary school education. If a researcher were to use such budgetary information on
primary school expenditures from government accounts, she may find that there is very little, if
any, impact of public primary education spending on education attainment of primary-schoolers.
In reality, such a result reveals little about the true worth of a unit of spending on primary
education spending. At the same time, it is difficult for the researcher to find out, over a period of
time and across countries, what is the "true" amount of spending on public prograrns.
Yet another reason the link between public spending and outcomes could be broken is the
displacement of private sector effort by public spending. This argument is eloquently made in
Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett (2000). Commenting on the weak links that several studies have
found between public spending on health and health status, the authors argue,  ". ..changes in the
price or availability of government interventions may induce a private supply response that can
mnitigate any actual impact on health outcomes." Thus, if an increase in public spending on health
4crowds-out private sector provision of such services then the likely impact of an additional unit
of public spending on health status may be minimal.
Does governance affect development outcomes? There is now a large empirical literature
2 on the relationship between a variety of governance indicators and development outcomes.  A
majority of these studies show that improved governance leads to better development outcomes.
These studies have analyzed the effects of corruption and institutions on, among other variables,
economic growth, public investment,  foreign direct investment, and social infrastructure.
Kaufman et al (1999) show that governance indicators (that include voice and accountability,
political stability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and
graft) have a strong direct negative impact on infant mortality. Gupta, Verhoeven,  and Tiongson
(1999) also find that countries with high corruption have high child and infant mortality rates.
In this section we have reviewed the research that links public spending with
development outcomes.  We have also provided information on the research that links governance
with development outcomes. But each of these captures only a part of the full picture. The reality
is that public spending, governance, and development  outcomes are interlinked. We believe that
governance3 affects the relationship between public spending and outcomes; it is this impact that
we seek to measure in our research.  Our main experiment is to see if differences in the efficacy of
public spending can be explained by the quality of governance.
3.  Production of Development  Outcomes
Suppose the development outcome of a public programnp in an economy i is produced from
the following model of production:
AI=*(.GDPiJ*Pubex  iJ Outcome.i  =  e  Ni  GDPi  where  a  > 0; ,6 20  (1)
where PubexPi is public spending on program p that produces OutcomePi in country i, Ni is the
country's population,  GDP  is gross domestic product, and A represents a set of country specific
factors.  The production function in equation (1)  indicates that the development outcome of a
2 Kaufnann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) provide a brief survey of this literature.
3In this paper we measure governance by two specific indicators: quality of bureaucracy and level of corruption.
Spublic program p in a country: (a) improves with an increase in its income; (b) improves (or does
not worsen) if an increased proportion of the country's resources  are spent on that public
program; and (c) depends on other country-specific  factors. The outcomes could, for example, be
indicators of health status (e.g., child mortality) or education attainment (e.g.,  proportion of
children completing primary education) at any given point of time, which can be influenced,
among other factors, by public spending.
Taking logs, equation (1)  can be written in linear form as:
ln(Outcome,  )= Ai +a  In GDP'  +6  In  (2)
Given data the above model can be estimated to examine,  among other things, the link between
public spending on program p and the associated outcome of that program.
3.1  Modeling the efficacy ofpublic spending: The governancefactor
In estimating the relationship between public spending and a development outcome as
specified in equation (2), a researcher typically takes the information on spending from public
budget documents.  But what if only a fraction of that spending is actually undertaken and the
remainder disappears (as in the Ugandan  example given above).  To allow for such a possibility,
let us suppose that only a fraction y (.) of public resources are actually spent for productive
purposes. Following Pritchett (1996), ,f, the coefficient on public spending on program p in
equation (2) can be written as:
i=y(.)*fp  (3)
where /3p  is the productivity of public capital that is created from the spending on program p. Let
us further assume that y(.), which measures the efficacy of public spending, is a function of the
state of governance,  Gi , in each country  i. Therefore,
Yi  = XO,i  + ql,i Gi (4)
Gi could indicate the level of corruption or the institutional capacity in country i. Substituting
from equations (3) and (4), and rearranging terms, equation (2) can be written as:
6ln(Outcome 1p)= A,  + a  Iln(  Ni)  +±p  (0o,1 +0,i  GJ)ln  GDPue  (x
In our empirical work we estimate variants of the above equation.
4.  Efficacy  of Public Health Spending
Every country-rich or poor, developed or underdeveloped-undertakes  public health
spending with a single dominant objective: to improve the health of its citizens. Different
countries adopt different approaches  in meeting this objective.  Some spend more public
resources  than others;  some spend more on preventive than curative care; and some countries rely
more on the private sector for service delivery.  There is a wide variation in public health
spending across countries: Governments  spend from less than 1 to more than 8 percent of their
GDP on public health related activities.
Our approach in this paper is to interact a public health spending variable with a
governance indicator and create a measure of "efficacious"  public spending on health. In turn, we
examine the impact of this measure on health status. This analysis allows us to empirically
examine whether public health spending is more effective in improving health status in countries
with good governance.4
4.1  Empirical  specification
Using the model outlined in Section 3, we estimate the following equation:
ln (HS)=  60 +  61 ln (PCGDP )I + 6 2 ln (PHSGDP )I +  3 Gi  (6)
+ 54Gi * In (PHSGDP )i  + B Xi  +si(
where the variables for country i are: HS-a measure of health status-Under-S  mortality (child)
rate or infant mortality rate; PCGDP-per  capita GDP measured in purchasing power parity
adjusted dollars; PHSGDP-share  of public health spending (defined as recurrent and capital
spending from government [central and local] budgets, external borrowings and grants) in  GDP;
G-a measure of governance (index of corruption or quality of bureaucracy); X-A vector of
4This is similar to the approach used by Burmside and Dollar (2000) in asking the question if  foreign aid has a stronger
(positive) impact on growth in countries with good policies.
7non-health related country specific factors; B-a vector of coefficients of  X; and E-an  error term.
In order to capture the direct effects that governance may have on health status, the variable GC  is
included as an independent term in the equation.
4.2  Data and  choice of variables
Our empirical analysis uses annual data for 1990 and 1997 (see Appendix A for more
information on data including sources). These two years are chosen because we have, for them,
the necessary information on a fairly decent sample of countries.  Moreover, we wanted to
compare our results with those of Filmer and Pritchett (1999), who have also used 1990 as the
year for their cross-national study.
We study the impact of public health spending on child (under 5) and infant mortality.
However, unlike previous researchers, we model the interaction between public spending and
governance indicators in assessing this impact. Like Filmer and Pritchett (1999), the variable on
public health spending that we use is available for a large cross-section of countries from the
World Development Indicators that are put together by the World Bank. This variable measures
total public spending on health; it is used because data on its composition across different health
inputs are not available.  We use two measures of governance-corruption  and bureaucratic
quality-to interact with public health spending.  These indicators-measured  on a scale of 0 to 6
(for corruption) and 1 to 6 (for bureaucratic quality) and available on a monthly basis-are put
together by the U.S.-based Political Risk Services  Group, which provides information on a
regular basis for international businesses. The index of corruption measures corruption within the
political system, which among other things reduces the effectiveness of government. The
indicator of bureaucratic  quality measures institutional strength and quality of  the civil service.  It
assesses how much strength and expertise bureaucrats have. Other non-health related variables
that we use in the regressions are standard in the literature; they include, among others, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, percentage of population that is Muslim, percentage of all females
aged  15 and above that have attained primary education, percentage of population in urban areas,
and the Gini coefficient which is a measure of income inequality. We also include  a demographic
variable-the percentage of population aged under-5  for the child mortality regressions  and
under-I  for the infant mortality regressions, respectively.
84.3  Empirical  results
Our health status regressions are done for two different samples.  The sample used for the
regressions with child (under 5) mortality as the dependent variable has a total of 148
observations over the two years (1990 and  1997) from 90 developed and developing countries. A
larger sample, with 169 observations from 98 (developed and developing) countries, is used for
the regressions with infant mortality as the dependent variable.  In both sets of regressions,  a
dummy variable is included to differentiate between the two sets of observations corresponding
to different years; this allows for independent trends in health status over time. From the two
samples, we obtain the mean values of child and infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) as 59 and
42, respectively.  The average share of public health spending in GDP for the two samples is
nearly 3.3 percent, with a range of less than one-half to over eight. The mean values for the
governance indicators-the corruption index and quality of  bureaucracy-are  3.5 and 3.7,
respectively. Finally,  the average values of the purchasing-power-parity  adjusted per capita GDP
(in 1990 dollars) for the two samples are 9,298 and 8,920, respectively.
Table IA. Summary Statistics on Public Health Spending,  Governance  and Outcomes
(Data from 90 countries over two years, 1990  and 1997)
Variables  Obsermtions  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Under-5 mortality rate  148  57.7  60.5  5  260
Public health spending (share in GDP)  148  3.32  2.13  .18  8.25
Per capita GDP (inPPP adjusted 1990$)  148  9,298  8,812  547  38,136
Index of corruption (least corrupt = 6)  148  3.5  1.5  0  6
Quality of bureaucracy  (highest = 6)  148  3.7  1.5  1  6
Note:  1. Countries in the sample are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh*,  Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Bulgaria,  Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China,  Colombia, Democratic  Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire,
Denmark, Ecuador*, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gabon*, Germany*,  Ghana, Greece, Guatemnala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau*,
Guyana*, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea,
Kuwait,  Lebanon,  Luxembourg,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Mozambique,  Netherlands,  New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,  Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Saudi  Arabia,  Senegal, South  Africa,  Spain,  Sri Lanka,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  Tanzania,  Thailand,  Togo,  Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen.
2. Countries marked with * in (a) have only one observation.
9Table 1B. Summary Statistics on Public Spending, Governance and Outcomes
(Data from 98 countries over two years, 1990 and 1997)
Variables  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Infant Mortality  Rate  169  42.3  37.6  3.7  150
Public health spending (share in GDP)  169  3.26  2.10  .18  8.25
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted  1990$)  169  8,920  8,877  420  38,135
Index of Corruption (least corrupt = 6)  169  3.5  1.4  0  6
Quality of Bureaucracy (highest =6)  169  3.6  1.5  1  6
Note: In addition to the countries listed in the above sample, the other countries are: Angola, Brunei, Dominican
Republic, Gambia, Mali,  Mongolia, United States,  and Zambia.
4.3.1  OLS regressions: Factors affecting health status
Table 2 contains the OLS estimates of our model given in equation (6). Equation (2.1)
presents the results from estimating a simple version of equation (6)-one that does not include
the governance  variable.  It indicates that a 1 percentage increase in per capita GDP at the margin
is associated with a .44 percent reduction in child mortality, i.e., the estimated elasticity of
mortality is  -.44. At the same time, a one percent increase in the share of public health spending
in GDP is linked with a .19 percent reduction in child mortality. These two and other non-health
related variables explain 92 percent of the variation in cross-national child mortality rates.5
5 When estimated in a rather parsimonious form-witi only two regressors: per capita GDP and public health spending-
the model explains 88  percent of the variation  in cross-national  child mortality rates.  Moreover, both variables are
statistically significant and have the right signs.
10Table 2. OLS Regressions:  Factors affecting  health status
(White heteroskedasticity-corrected  t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent  variables -4  Under-5 mortality (natural  log)  Infant mortality (natural  log)
Independent variables I  Eq. (2.1)  Eq. (2.2)  Eq. (2.3)  Eq. (2.4)  Eq. (2.5)  Eq. (2.6)
GDP per capita in PPP adjusted  1990$ (In)  -0.44  -0.37  -0.33  -0.47  -0.39  -0.35
(-4.94)  (-4.35)  (-3.55)  (-5.82)  (-5.30)  (-4.16)
Public  health  spending  (In of share  of  -0.19  0.08  0.15  -0.19  0.09  0.18
GDP)  (-2.45)  (0.68)  (1.47)  (-3.02)  (0.99)  (2.25)
Index  of  corruption (least corrupt = 6)  -0.04  -0.03
(-1.03)  (-0.91)
Quality of bureaucracy (highest = 6)  0.03  0.05
(0.79)  (1.56)
Index of corruption x public health  -0.07  -0.08
spending (In  of share of GDP)  (-2.36)  (-2.92)
Quality  of bureaucracy  x  public  health  -0.10  -0.12
spending (In  of share of GDP)  (-3.77)  (-4.61)
Female education  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.008  -0.008  -0.009
(-3.57)  (-3.78)  (-4.22)  (-2.94)  (-3.20)  (-3.95)
Income inequality  0.009  0.007  0.006  0.01  0.007  0.007
(2.14)  (1.61)  (1.51)  (2.41)  (1.70)  (1.84)
Predominantly Muslim  -0.0004  -0.002  -0.001  -0.0003  -0.001  -0.001
(-0.26)  (-1.24)  (-0.76)  (-0.27)  (-1.19)  (-0.91)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization  0.40  0.52  0.57  0.09  0.22  0.25
(3.00)  (4.15)  (4.29)  (0.73)  (1.99)  (2.18)
Access to safe water  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.004
(-0.55)  (-0.74)  (-0.93)  (-1.03)  (-1.16)  (-1.64)
Degree of urbanization  0.004  0.002  0.004  0.004  0.002  0.004
(1.45)  (0.93)  (1.43)  (1.47)  (0.96)  (1.56)
Percentage of population aged under 5  0.04  0.04  0.04
(2.43)  (2.74)  (2.73)
Percentage of population aged under  1  0.16  0.17  0.16
(2.45)  (2.88)  (2.70)
Distance from the Equator  -0.15  0.24  0.23  -0.10  0.28  0.32
(-0.51)  (0.78)  (0.73)  (-0.38)  (1.05)  (1.16)
Dummy for year 1997  0.05  -0.002  0.01  0.02  -0.02  -0.01
(0.88)  (-0.03)  (0.03)  (0.41)  (-0.49)  (-0.17)
Constant  7.25  6.90  6.40  7.15  6.74  6.26
(9.01)  (8.97)  (7.80)  (10.37)  (10.22)  (8.50)
R-squared  .92  .94  .93  .91  .93  .93
Number of observations  148  148  148  169  169  169
Earlier in this section we have discussed creating a measure of "efficacious"  public
spending on health. To do this, we interact public health spending with the index of corruption
and include this as an additional regressor.  To capture the direct effect of corruption on health
status, we also include the index of corruption independently. This result is reported in equation
(2.2).6 The coefficient on the public health spending is positive and statistically insignificant, but
6 One alternative to the standard OLS technique is to allow for serial correlation between two error terms corresponding
to the same country.  Since we have only two years  of time series, there will be at most two error terms  per country.
Allowing for this type of correlation, and re-running  the regressions using the Generalized Least Squares method, our
results are very similar to those obtained using OLS. We chose to report the latter because they are considerably more
robust to different specifications  and sets of independent variables.
11spending interacted with corruption has a significant coefficient of  -.07 (t-statistics of 2.4).
Among other regressors, income inequality and ethno-linguistic fractionalization  are positively
and significantly correlated with child mortality. In countries where more women have completed
primary education, child mortality is lower.  Countries with a higher percentage of population
under-5 have higher child mortality rates. A similar result (see equation 2.3) is obtained when the
spending variable is interacted with the quality of bureaucracy index: the coefficient on spending
alone is positive and insignificant, but the interaction term has a significantly negative
coefficient.  The results on the infant mortality variable are very similar (equations 2.4  - 2.6)
though the elasticity of infant mortality with respect to health spending is smaller than that of
under-5 mortality.  This is consistent with the theory that neo-natal deaths are caused by factors
that are more genetically determined than deaths occurring later in life.
All in all, our results in Table 2 support two basic hypotheses: (1) rich countries have
lower child and infant mortalities; and (2) the link between public health spending and child
mortality is negative, but the efficacy of public spending in lowering child and infant mortalities
is positively related with the level of governance. The first is a fairly consistent result in the
literature.  The second finding confirms what proponents of good governance have been arguing:
Well-functioning public institutions are critical for translating public spending into effective
services. In the next section we examine the case of treating public health spending as
endogenous.
4.3.2  Two-stage least squares  (2SLS) regressions
The OLS results presented in the previous sub-section are based on the assumption that
public health spending is exogenously deternined. As previous researchers  have noted, it is
possible that the two main variables in our analysis-public health spending and health status-
are jointly determined.  There also exists the possibility of  reverse causation. For example, it is
likely that when faced with poor and/or deteriorating health status of their citizens,  governments
would increase spending on health. Rich countries, when providing debt relief to poor countries,
often insist that such relief be spent on activities that would improve health and education
outcomes.
12To test the robustness of our results, we need to address the endogeneity problem. We do
this by using instruments for public health spending (as well as for the interaction term) in a two-
stage least squares regression. The instruments that we use are public health spending (expressed
as a ratio of GDP) of a neighboring country;  and (own) population. The process by which we
choose the most appropriate neighbor is explained in Appendix  A.
The 2SLS regressions  are reported in Table 3. In our basic equation (3.1), which does not
include the governance variable, we find that the public spending variable is statistically
insignificant and has the wrong sign.7 When we include the governance measures  and interact
them with the spending variable, our OLS results are confirmed.  Equation (3.2) reports  -.37 as
the estimated elasticity of mortality with respect to income. Our measure of "efficacious" public
spending-the interactive term-is of the right sign and is statistically significant, similar to the
OLS result reported earlier. Results when public spending is interacted with the quality of
bureaucracy index (equation 3.3) and when infant mortality is used as the dependent variable
(equations 3.4  - 3.6)  are similar. In the next sub-section, we look at the impact of public health
spending on health status and examine how it changes under different levels of governance.
4.3.3  Impact of  good governance in improving the efficacy ofpublic health spending
Table 4 reports the net impact of public health spending on health status by combining the
results obtained through different regressions reported in sub-sections 4.3.1  and 4.3.2. The first
part of the table-Section A, which is based on regressions without the interactive (public
spending with governance indicator) regressor-shows mixed results. It shows that when the
OLS procedure is used, the impact of public health spending on under-5 mortality and infant
mortality is negative, i.e., increasing public resources for health lowers these mortalities.  On the
other hand, when the 2SLS procedure is used to take into account the joint endogeneity problem,
the impact of public health spending on both the mortalities is not significantly different from
zero.
7This finding is also consistent with the results reported by Filmer and Pritchett (1999).
13Table 3. 2SLS Regressions: Factors affecting  health status
(White heteroskedasticity-corrected  t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent variables -+  Under-5 mortality (natural  log)  Infant mortality (natural  log)
Independent variables  4  Eq. (3.1)  Eq. (3.2)  Eq. (3.3)  Eq. (3.4)  Eq. (3.5)  Eq. (3.6)
GDP per capita in PPP adjusted 1990$ (In)  -0.53  -0.37  -0.32  -0.47  -0.37  -0.36
(-3.98)  (-4.7)  (-3.47)  (-5.41)  (-4.93)  (-4.64)
Public  health  spending  (In  of  share  of  0.16  -1.04  -0.19  -0.16  -0.13  -0.05
GDP)  (0.42)  (-1.50)  (-0.75)  (-0.62)  (-0.37)  (-0.23)
Index of corruption (least corrupt = 6)  0.15  0.03
(1.32)  (0.48)
Quality of bureaucracy (highest = 6)  0.03  0.05
(0.69)  (1.02)
Index of corruption x public health  -0.10  -0.10
spending (In of  share of GDP)  (-3.07)  (-3.20)
Quality  of Bureaucracy  x  Public  health  -0.07  -0.05
spending (In of share of GDP)  (-1.95)  (-2.82)
Female education  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.008  -0.008  -0.01
(-3.06)  (-2.92)  (-4.33)  (-2.97)  (-3.08)  (-3.51)
Income inequality  0.008  0.01  0.008  0.01  0.008  0.008
(1.65)  (1.80)  (2.10)  (2.23)  (1.99)  (2.31)
Predominantly Muslim  0.001  -0.003  -0.001  -0.0003  -0.002  -0.001
(0.37)  (-1.57)  (-1.08)  (-0.18)  (-1.51)  (-1.11)
Ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  0.56  -0.01  0.40  0.10  0.15  0.18
(2.75)  (-0.03)  (2.11)  (0.76)  (0.89)  (1.20)
Access to safe water  -0.006  0.01  0.0006  -0.003  0.0005  -0.002
(-1.09)  (1.31)  (0.17)  (-0.75)  (0.10)  (-0.48)
Degree of urbanization  0.005  0.001  0.003  0.004  0.002  0.004
(1.54)  (0.39)  (1.45)  (1.50)  (1.04)  (1.64)
Percentage of population aged under 5  0.03  0.07  0.04
(1.72)  (2.37)  (2.69)
Percentage of population aged under 1  0.16  0.21  0.18
(2.40)  (2.88)  (2.74)
Distance from the Equator  -0.53  1.21  0.35  -0.14  0.69  0.45
(-1.01)  (1.81)  (1.03)  (-0.28)  (1.44)  (1.30)
Dummy for year 1997  0.009  0.18  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.009
(0.13)  (1.28)  (0.85)  (0.38)  (0.28)  (0.15)
Constant  8.08  4.08  6.16  7.20  -3.94  6.18
(6.86)  (2.19)  (7.78)  (8.80)  (-1.37)  (9.62)
R 2 of first-stage regressions
Public health spending  .71  .71  .64  .65
Public  health  spending  x (corruption  or  .88  .87  .86  .85
bureaucracy)
Other statistics
R-squared  .90  .93  .92  .91  .91  .92
Number of Observations  148  148  148  169  169  169
Note: Instruments: Neighbor's public health spending, population, neighbor's public health spending x index of corruption,
Neighbor's public health spending x index of bureaucracy.
14Table 4. The Impact of Public Health Spending on Health Status
A. Results  from regressions  without the governance interaction  term
Impact on -4  Under-5 mortality  Infant mortality
OLS (Table  2)  -. 19**  -. 19**
2SLS (Table 3)  .16  -. 16
B.  Results from re  essions with the governance interaction  term, i.e.,  82 + 64*G1
Impact on  - Under-5 mortality  Infant mortality
Corruption  Quality of  Corruption  Quality of
index  bureaucracy  index  bureaucracy
2.0  3 5 M  5.0u  2.28  3.7m  5.2"  2.18  3. 5m  4.9"  2.1  3.6m  5.1U
Evaluated at -k
OLS (Table 2)  -0.06  -.16**  -.26**  -. 07  -.22**  -.37**  -.07  -. 17**  -.27**  -.06  -.23**  -.41**
2SLS (Table 3)  -1.24  -1.40*  -1.56**  -.35  -.45**  -.56**  I-34  -.49  -1.66*  -.24  -.38**  -.52**
Note: 1. Evaluated at: mThe sample mean; B  One standard deviation below the mean; and U  One standard deviation
above the mean.
2. Based on a 't' test for functions of parameters:  Significantly lower than 0 at the  10-percent level;  Significantly
lower than 0  at the 5-percent level.
Our main finding, however,  emerges  from the bottom half of the table: Section B reports
the total impact of public health spending on under-5  and infant mortalities when the model
includes the interactive regressor. The net impact from the different regressions  reported in the
sub-sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 is calculated as follows:
%  A in mortality  '2  +84G 1
%  A in public health spending
where 4 are the coefficient estimates of equation (6) and Gi is the governance indicator-
corruption index or quality of bureaucracy.  In Table 4, this elasticity of mortality with respect to
public health spending is calculated  at different levels of governance, using the estimates of the
coefficients  , from the regressions previously reported (in Tables 2 and 3). Each time, a t-test is
used to evaluate if the estimated elasticity is significantly different from zero (see Maddala  1992,
for more information on this procedure).  For example,  Section B shows that the elasticity of
under-5 mortality, obtained from the OLS regression (2.2), is  -.16 (significant at the 5-percent
level), when evaluated at 3.5, which is the sample, mean of the corruption index. When evaluated
at 5.0 (one standard deviation above the mean value), which indicates that corruption is lower,
the elasticity is  -.26 and is significant at the 5-percent level. Finally, it is not significantly
different from zero when the corruption index is 2.0-one standard deviation below the mean
15value.  The elasticities are consistently negative and increasing in absolute size when evaluated at
a good level of govemance. There is a clear pattem that in countries with low levels of
governance (i.e., countries which are rated as very corrupt or are rated to have very ineffective
bureaucracy),  public health spending at the margin will be inefficacious. Moreover, these
findings are consistent along all dimensions, i.e., method of estimation  (OLS or 2SLS),
govemance indicator (corruption index or quality of bureaucracy),  and health status (under-5
mortality or infant mortality).
5.  Measuring the Efficacy of Public Education Spending
As discussed in Section 2, past research findings on the link between public education
spending and measurable outcomes provide mixed evidence. In studying this relationship, our
aim is to examine how is it affected when we move from a state of low quality to high quality
govemance.
5.1  Choosing a measure of education outcome
One important difference between the health and education sectors is that it is difficult to
find educational outcome measures that are consistent across countries.  In education there is no
equivalent to the child and infant mortality indicators used in the health sector.  Data on
enrolment rates are widely available, but they do not reflect quality differences  across countries.
Moreover, enrolment numbers, especially at the primary level, include repeaters as well as
students that subsequently drop out of school. For example, Filmer and Pritchett (1999) report
that in almost all countries  in South America,  enrolment in the first grade is nearly 100 percent,
but due to high dropouts rates, a large proportion of those enrolled do not complete primary
school education.
Educational attainment  has been used by several researchers to measure outcomes (Barro
and Lee  1996, 2000).8 Attainment can be defined as the number or proportion of school-age
children that enter and complete primary or secondary school, or a particular grade. This is a
8Literacy rates  are also measures that can be used for educational attainment. However,  data on these are generally
available only as stock rather than flow measures; for example, figures on the proportion of all  adults that are literate are
widely available (e.g., World Development Indicators 2000). But it is difficult to link such a measure with the available
data on annual education spending, which is a flow measure. Standardized test scores are available for very few countries,
mostly developed.
16superior measure to enrolment because it excludes students that drop out of school prematurely
and the number of repeaters does not affect it. There is another advantage of using educational
attainment:  it has a strong inverse relationship with dropout rates, and the latter are, in turn,
markedly affected by educational  quality (Harbison  and Hanushek 1992, Barro and Lee 1996).
Holding other things constant, students who receive good education-as reflected by good
instruction aided with textbooks and other instructional materials-are more likely to stay in
school. Thus, one could argue that high attainment rates indirectly reflect high educational
quality.
5.2  Empirical  specification, data and  choice of  variables
We estimate a similar model to that which was used for the health sector regressions:
In (FPS i) =  ,, + A, In (PCGDP  )i + A,  In (PESGDP  )i + A3 Gi
+ A 4Gi *In(PESGDP  )+  B Xi  + wi
where the variables for country i are: FPS -proportion of those who fail to complete primary
school education;9 PCGDP-per  capita GDP measured in purchasing power parity adjusted
dollars; PESGDP-share  of public primary education spending in GDP; G-a measure of
governance (index of corruption or quality of bureaucracy); X-a vector of non-health related
country specific factors; B-a vector of coefficients of X; and w-an error term. In order to
capture the direct effects that governance may have on education outcome, the variable Gi is also
included as an independent term in the equation.
The measure of educational failure that we use is constructed  as follows:
EFf'  = 100 - Attain PSj" = 100 - Intake PSj' x EComp  PSOj'0
Attain PS"'  is an estimate of the percentage of all children agedj - the official age of entry into
primary school-at time t who actually enter Grade  1 and are expected to continue and complete
Grade 5.  This estimate reflects two factors: (1) Intake PSi ' which is the proportion of all
children of primary-school entry age who actually start school at time t; and (2) EComp PSiJ,'
which measures the proportion of Intake PSi"  who are expected to continue and finish Grade 5.
17The measure  EComp  PSo 5 is calculated using data on completion rates for students in Grade 1
through 5 at time t (for more details, see Appendix A). The cutoff point for calculation of the
completion rate is Grade 5 rather than the final grade in primary school, because the latter varies
substantially across countries.10
There is ample anecdotal and empirical evidence that educational outcomes are affected
by family factors such as parents' income, occupations  and educational background
(Psacharopoulos  and Woodhull  1985, Hanushek  1995, Barro and Lee  1996). These are reflected
in three of our right-hand side variables: per capita income, the Gini coefficient  (an indicator of
income distribution), and the overall level of adult literacy.  One could argue that the adult
literacy variable is endogenous as unobserved factors affecting it may also affect primary school
attainment.  This is not a major issue in our analysis as our primary interest is not in the
coefficient of the adult literacy variable.  We do check our results by performing each education
regression twice: once with adult literacy as a right-hand side variable, and once without it.
Primary education spending is one of the key regressors in our analysis, along with the same two
governance variables as in the health regressions: the level of corruption and of bureaucratic
quality. Other right-hand side variables include ethno-linguistic fractionalization,  the proportion
of Muslims in the population, the level of  urbanization,  the proportion of the population aged 6
to 12, and a dummy variable for East Asia. The first three are also included in the child and
infant mortality regressions; they reflect racial, cultural and physical circumstances that may
arguably affect education provision and demand. The proportion of the population aged between
6 and 12 is a demographic factor that has shown to be strongly related to educational outcomes
(Mingat and Tan 1998). A dummy variable for the countries in the East Asia Region is included
as there seems to be a strong emphasis on the importance of  education in these countries,
probably due to cultural reasons (Stevenson 1992, Barro and Lee 1996). Our sample includes
three countries from this Region:  China, Thailand and South Korea.
9  To be consistent with our mortality measures of the health sector, we use education non-attainment as our outcome
measure.
10En principle,  a similar technique could be used to comnpute attainment at the secondary and tertiary levels. In practice,
however, the data required for this are not available for a sufficiently large number of countries. We tried using secondary
school enrolment as a proxy for secondary level attainment, a not indefensible procedure since secondary school dropout
rates tend to be relatively low in many countries. The ensuing regressions did not, however, perform well. In this paper,
we report only the results of regressions explaining variations in failure to attain five years of primary education.
185.3  Empirical results
Our education results are based on a sample that has 72 observations from 57 countries
over the same two years as for the health regressions:  1990 and 1997. Summary statistics
presented in Table 5 indicate that on average, 23.1 percent of students of official primary school
entry age failed to complete five years of primary education.  The average share of public
education spending at the primary level in GDP is close to 1.5 percent, with a range of less than
0.5 to 4 percent. The mean values for the governance indicators-the corruption index and quality
of bureaucracy -are  3.4 and 3.3, respectively.  The average purchasing-power-parity  adjusted
value of per capita GDP for this sample is 6,983 measured in 1990 dollars-significantly less
than in the two samples that we used for the health sector analysis.
Table 5. Summary Statistics on Public Education Spending, Governance  and Outcomes
(Data from 57 countries over two years, 1990 and 1997)
Variables  Observations  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max
Primary Education "Failure Rate"  72  23.1  23.0  0  77.9
Primary education  spending (share in GDP)  72  1.5  0.8  0.4  4.4
Per capita GDP (in PPP adjusted  1990$)  72  6,983  6,323  420  26,549
Index of Corruption (least corrupt = 6)  72  3.4  1.3  0  6
Quality of Bureaucracy (highest = 6)  72  3.3  1.4  1  6
Note: 1.  Countries in the samrple are: Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh*, Bolivia*, Botswana*, Brazil*, Bulgaria*, Burkina Faso*,
Cameroon*, Chile*, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo*, Costa Rica, Cote dlvoire*, Ecuador*, El Salvador*, Finland*,
France*,  The Gambia*,  Greece,  Guatemala*,  Haiti*,  Hungary*,  Ireland,  Israel*,  Italy, Jamaica*,  South Korea*,  Malawi, Mali*,
Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique*, Namibia*, New Zealand*, Nicaragua, Niger*, Norway*, Pakistan*, Panama*, Paraguay*, Poland*,
Romania*,  Saudi  Arabia*,  Senegal*,  Sudan*,  Sweden*,  Syria, Tanzania*,  Thailand*,  Togo*,  Trinidad  and Tobago*, Tunisia*,
Uruguay,  Venezuela, Zimbabwe*.
2.  Countries marked with * in above have only one observation.
5.3.1  Regressions: Factors affecting education outcome
We begin with OLS estimation of equation (7). The results are reported in Table 6. The
most important factor explaining the variation in failure to complete  five years of  primary school
education appears  to be per capita GDP. A percent increase in per capita GDP at the margin is
associated with a reduction of over one percent in the failure rate. This finding is consistent
across all equations. Of course, this is not unexpected:  students in rich countries have higher
levels of education attainment.  Our primary interest is, however, in the public education spending
variable and its interaction with the governance indicators. When estimated without the
19interaction term-equation (6.  )-the coefficient on primary education spending has the correct
sign, but is not significant. When the interaction term (with the corruption index)  is included-
equation (6.2)-the coefficient on the spending variable changes sign but continues to have a low
t-value. More importantly,  the interaction term has the correct sign and is highly significant.
Among other variables, the dummy for East Asian countries is, as expected,  highly significant;
countries in the East Asia Region are known to have high primary school attainment. The income
inequality variable has the right sign-that is counties with high inequality tend to have a higher
failure rate-but has low significance.  We find that including the adult literacy rate (equations
6.4 to 6.6) does not make much of a difference to the results; the explained variation in the
failure rate is now around 68 percent.
It is quite possible that governments  in countries with low primary education attainment
react by increasing their primary education budget. Thus, as in the case of health regressions, our
OLS estimates could be biased due to reverse causation. To tackle this problem, we estimate
equation (7) using the 2SLS method, allowing public primary education spending and its
interaction term with governance to be endogenous. As before, the instruments that we use are:
the primary education spending of a neighboring country,  and own population.
We present our 2SLS estimates in Table 7. Estimates of the coefficient  on per capita GDP
continue to support the hypothesis that rich countries have low rates of primary school failure.
Once again this finding is consistent across all equations reported in the table. When compared
with the OLS results from equation (6.1), the coefficient  on primary education spending in
equation (7.1) is higher in (absolute) value. Moreover,  as before, it has the correct sign and is
statistically significant. When spending is interacted with the corruption index-equation (7.2)-
the interaction term has the correct (negative) sign and is significant at the 5-percent  level.
Among other variables, the East Asia dummy continues to be highly significant; and income
inequality continues to have the right sign, but it now has low significance.  Compared with the
OLS results, there is not much of a drop in explained variation in failure rates across all
equations.
20Table 6. OLS Regressions:  Factors affecting  education outcomes
(White heteroskedasticity-corrected  t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent variable -X  Failure rate  (natural log)
Independent variables 4  Eq. (6.1)  Eq.  (6.2)  Eq. (6.3)  Eq(6.4)  Eq. (6.5)  Eq.  (6.6)
GDP per capita in PPP adjusted 1990$ (hn)  -1.58  -1.51  -1.17  -1.61  -1.50  -1.13
(-4.95)  (-4.83)  (-3.17)  (-4.44)  (-4.21)  (-2.57)
Primary education spending (In of share of  -0.35  1.14  0.96  -0.36  1.14  0.97
GDP)  (-1.32)  (1.74)  (1.48)  (-1.30)  (1.69)  (1.47)
East Asia dumrny  -3.31  -3.59  -3.24  -3.34  -3.58  -3.21
(-2.57)  (-2.62)  (-2.39)  (-2.55)  (-2.54)  (-2.28)
Adult illiteracy rate  -0.003  0.001  0.004
(-0.28)  (0.10)  (0.29)
Index of corruption  (least corrupt = 6)  -0.08  -0.08
(-0.59)  (-0.58)
Quality of bureaucracy (highest = 6)  -0.16  -0.17
(-0.90)  (-0.93)
Index of corruption  x  primary  education  -0.43  -0.43
spending (In of share of GDP)  (-2.47)  (-2.44)
Quality of bureaucracy  x primary  -0.38  -0.38
education spending  (In of share of  (-2.12)  (-2.12)
GDP)
Income inequality  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03
(1.50)  (1.34)  (1.30)  (1.48)  (1.33)  (1.27)
Predominantly  Muslimn  0.007  0.005  0.007  0.008  0.005  0.006
(1.81)  (1.54)  (1.79)  (1.47)  (0.96)  (1.03)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization  -1.14  -1.19  -0.55  -1.10  -1.20  -0.57
(-1.77)  (-2.09)  (-0.87)  (-1.69)  (-2.13)  (-0.90)
Degree of urbanization  0.006  0.002  0.001  0.006  0.002  0.002
(0.62)  (0.21)  (0.09)  (0.49)  (0.22)  (0.15)
Percentage of population aged 6 to 12  -0.05  -0.06  -0.05  -0.05  -0.07  -0.05
(-0.77)  (-1.10)  (-0.71)  (-0.76)  (-1.14)  (-0.78)
Dumtnynforyear  1997  0.11  0.004  -0.11  0.10  0.007  -0.11
(0.39)  (0.01)  (-0.39)  (0.35)  (0.03)  (-0.37)
Constant  14.90  15.43  12.47  15.19  15.33  12.07
(4.99)  (5.36)  (3.83)  (4.27)  (4.52)  (2.98)
R-squared  .66  .69  .68  .66  .69  .68
Number of observations  72  72  72  72  72  72
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(White heteroskedasticity-corrected  t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent variable -+  Failure rate (natural log)
Independent variables  Eq. (7.1)  Eq. (7.2)  Eq. (7.3)  Eq. (7.4)  Eq. (7.5)  Eq. (7.6)
GDP per capita in PPP adjusted  1990S (In)  -1.79  -1.44  -1.12  -1.27  -1.42  -1.11
(-2.31)  (-3.66)  (-2.39)  (-2.74)  (-3.72)  (-2.32)
Primaty education  spending (In of share of  -1.13  2.38  3.07  -1.80  2.60  2.99
GDP)  (-2.62)  (1.61)  (1.51)  (-2.30)  (1.61)  (1.58)
East Asia dummy  -3.72  -3.73  -3.42  -3.82  -3.72  -3.41
(-3.58)  (-4.83)  (-4.17)  (-3.73)  (-4.72)  (-4.06)
Adult illiteracy rate  -0.02  0.003  0.001
(-1.03)  (0.16)  (0.07)
Index of Corruption (least corrupt = 6)  0.04  0.05
(0.29)  (0.35)
Quality of Bureaucracy (highest = 6)  0.11  0.10
(0.50)  (0.43)
Index  of corruption  x  primary  education  -0.89  -0.94
spending (In of share of GDP)  (-2.95)  (-2.94)
Quality of bureaucracy  x primary education  -1.11  -1.08
spending (In of share of GDP)  (-2.67)  (-2.76)
Income inequality  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02
(1.36)  (0.98)  (1.08)  (1.36)  (0.93)  (1.08)
Predominantly Muslim  0.008  0.005  0.006  0.01  0.004  0.006
(1.40)  (1.03)  (1.21)  (1.66)  (0.56)  (0.78)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization  -0.08  -1.22  -0.51  0.07  -1.30  -0.52
(-0.10)  (-1.26)  (-0.48)  (0.07)  (-1.23)  (-0.50)
Degree of urbanization  0.004  -0.001  -0.003  -0.0002  -0.001  -0.002
(0.33)  (-0.10)  (-0.25)  (-0.01)  (-0.06)  (-0.21)
Percentage of population aged 6 to 12  -0.009  -0.05  -0.02  -0.003  -0.05  -0.02
(-0.11)  (-0.65)  (-0.22)  (-0.04)  (-0.66)  (-0.24)
Dummyforyear  1997  0.12  0.03  -0.15  0.07  0.04  -0.15
(0.34)  (0.09)  (-0.42)  (0.19)  (0.11)  (-0.42)
Constant  10.59  14.71  11.21  12.14  14.57  11.3
(2.25)  (3.68)  (2.72)  (2.40)  (3.76)  (2.69)
R 2 of first-stage  regressions
Primary education  spending  .30  .32  .33  .36
Primary education spending x (corruption  .41  .50  .43  .53
or bureaucracy)
Other statistics
R-squared  .54  .66  .63  .55  .65  .64
Number of  observations  72  72  72  72  72  72
Note: Instruments: Neighbor's primary education  spending, population, neighbor's primary education spending x index of
corruption, Neighbor's primary education spending x index of bureaucracy.
In Table 8 we present our overall results on the impact of primary education spending on
the "failure" rate. Once again we find evidence in support of the hypothesis that in a country with
good governance, education spending is efficacious in lowering education failure rates. The
elasticity of primary education  failure with respect to public education spending is consistently
negative and increasing in absolute size when evaluated at a good level of governance.
22Table 8. The Impact of Primary Education Spending on Education Outcomes
A.  7he impact on primary  education "Failure"  rate (from regressions  without the Governance interaction
term):
Regressions without adult illiteracy  Regressions with adult illiteracy
OLS (Table  -. 35  -. 36
6)
2SLS (Table  -1.13  -1.80
7)
B. The impact on primary  education "Failure"  rate (from regressions with the Governance interaction
term, i.e.,  22 + 24*Gd)
Evaluated at  Corruption  Quality  Corruption  Quality
index  of  bureaucracy  index  of  bureaucracy
2.1  3,4M  4.7U  19B  3.3M  4,7U  2.1  3,4M  4.7U  I9B  3,3M  4,7U
OLS (Table  .23  -.33  -.89**  .24  -.30  -.83**  .24  -.33  -.89**  -.28  -.28  -.81**
6)
2SLS (Table  .S2  -.64  -1.79**  .97  -. 58  -2.13**  .62  -.60  -1.82**  .94  -.56  -2.07**
7)
Note: 1.  Evaluated at: MThe sample mean; B One standard deviation below the mean; and u  One standard deviation
above the mean.
2. Based on a 't'  test for functions of parameters:  Significantly lower than 0 at the 10-percent  level;
Significantly  lower than 0 at the 5-percent level.
6.  Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the links between public spending, governance, and
outcomes.  Our primary investigation was to examine the role of governance-measured by the
level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy-and  ask how it affects the relationship
between public spending and outcomes.  Using data from a cross-section of countries over two
years, we found that public health spending has a negative impact on both child and infant
mortalities in countries that have good governance.  As the level of corruption goes down (or the
quality of bureaucracy  goes up), public spending on health becomes more effective in lowering
child and infant mortalities.  Our findings also indicate that in countries rated as very corrupt or
rated to have a very ineffective bureaucracy,  public health spending at the margin will be
inefficacious. Linking public spending on primary education with failure  to attain primary
education, we found a similar result. Increasing public spending on primary education is likely to
be more effective in increasing primary education attainment in a country with good governance.
23These results have important implications  for enhancing the development  effectiveness  of
public spending.  Simply increasing public spending on health and education is less likely to lead
to better outcomes if countries have poor govemance. These findings are particularly relevant for
developing countries, where, on average, the state of governance  is quite poor. Two of the seven
International Development Goals are: (i) Achieving universal primary education in all countries
by 2015; and (ii) lowering child mortality by three-fourths and infant mortality by two-thirds by
2015.  1  Increasing public spending on health and education is an easier option than improving
governance, but as our findings suggest the easier option may not lead to achievement of these
goals.
Appendix A.
This appendix provides details on the data used for this research.
I.  Data on health and education variables
The data on child mortality, infant mortality, adult illiteracy, public health spending, and
public primary-school  education spending were obtained from the World Bank Database (various
years). The data on the percentages of females aged  15 and above with primary education are
from Barro and Lee (2000). The education attainment variable in the regressions was computed
using data on primary school intake rates as well as rates of completion of Grade 5, as explained
below. These data were taken from UNESCO (various years).
The expected completion rate measure  ECompRO ,  used to compute the "failure rate" in
the education regressions (see Section 5.2) is taken from UNESCO data. UNESCO using the
"Reconstructed Cohort Method" computes it. The method is explained in detail in Fredriksen
(1991); it can be summarized by the following formula:
ECompPSOt5'  =  (Compo1).(Complf-2'  ).(Comp2-3 ).(COmp3,4 ).(Comp45 )
The International Development Goals measure progress from 1990 and lookto whatcanbe achievedby 2015. They set
targets for reductions in poverty, improvements  in health and education, and protection of the environment, and have
been adopted  by the  World Bank,  the  International  Monetary  Fund,  and members of the  Development Assistance
Conmmittee of  the OECD. They were supported during the Millennium Declaration of the United Nations, adopted by the
General Assembly in September 2000.
24where  Comp"' is the actual  proportion of students entering and completing Grade  I only
between times t -1 and t;  Comp,  is the actual  proportion of students entering and completing
Grade 2 only between times t -1 and t; and so on. These one-year actual completion rates for
each grade individually can be computed from data on enrolment and repetition rates for Grades
1 through 5, at times t -1 and t. Using the "Reconstructed Cohort Method" to compute expected
five-year completion rates in this way is far less data-intensive than calculating actual five-year
completion rates, which would require tracking of new students over five consecutive years (and
more if there are repeaters). Data on the latter are available for only a few countries. Educational
attainment data are also available, over five-year periods until 2000 for a wide range of countries,
in Barro and Lee (1996, 2000). However,  unlike the data from UNESCO, these are stock rather
than flow measures; they provide information on the proportion  of all adults that have completed
primary education.  These do not have a clear relationship between flow measures of education
spending at different points in time.
II.  Data on governance  indicators
The indicators of corruption and quality of bureaucracy  are taken from ratings made by
experts at Political Risk Services (2001). This is not the only source of such ratings;  however, it
is the only one with wide country coverage, providing ratings for 140 countries. Researchers
quite commonly use it.
III.  Other variables
The World Bank (various years) is the source of our data on GDP per capita,  safe water
access, total population and the percentage of the latter living in urban areas. The data on the
Gini coefficient come from the database compiled for the Dollar and Kraay (2001) paper; these
were obtained directly from the authors. Our data on ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  (a measure
of ethnic diversity), the proportion of Muslims and the distance of each country from the Equator
are from the well-cited paper by La Porta and others (1999). The distance  from the Equator is
computed by taking the absolute value of the latitude of each country from CIA (1996),  and then
scaling this to take values between  0 and 1.
25IV.  Choice of neighbors
In the 2SLS health (education) regressions, we use health (education)  spending of a
neighboring country as one of the instruments.  In this sub-section, we explain how we choose a
country's neighbor.
There were two underlying principles-besides  geographical proximity-behind our
selection process for the most appropriate neighbor N for a country X. First, X and N should at
least be not too dissimilar in terms of size, language and per-capita income.  Second, X is more
likely to "look up" to a neighboring country, and to try to emulate its health and education
spending patterns, if this neighbor is relatively well established and important. Guided by these
principles, we put together the data on neighbor as follows:
*  Step  1.  All  countries  sharing a border with X were first identified.  Among these,  those
without data on the appropriate type of spending (health or education) were discarded. Also,
those in situations of serious conflict - such as the countries of Former Yugoslavia, as well
as Liberia and the Democratic Republic of  Congo (in 1997) - were discarded.
*  Step 2. If there were less than 3 candidate neighbors remaining after enacting Step 1 (as was
the case if  X was an island country, for example), then additional countries were added to the
list of candidates, with the aim of going into Step  3 with at least 3 candidates  identified.
These additions were based solely on the criterion of geographical proximity.
*  Step 3. Countries with less than half the total population of X, if any, were then discarded
from the list of candidates, unless this removed  all countries from the list - in which case
Step 3 was ignored.
*  Step 4. Countries that were not in the same regional/language  group (defined below), if any,
were then dropped from the list of  candidates, unless this removed all countries from the list
- in which case Step 4 was ignored.
*  Step 5. Countries that were not in the same income class (defined below), if any, were then
dropped from the list of candidates, unless this removed all countries from the list - in which
case Step 5 was ignored.
*  Step  6.  Countries  that were  in a lower income  class (defined  below), if any,  were  then
dropped from the list of  candidates, unless this removed all countries from the list - in which
case Step 6 was ignored.
*  Step  7. If there  was now just one candidate  remaining  on the list,  this was the chosen
neighbor N. If  there was now more than one candidate remaining on the list, the one with the
highest total GDP was the chosen neighbor N.
Regional/Language  Groups.
For the above selection process, all countries were divided into the following
regional/language  groups. Group A-ex-Spanish colonies in South and Central America; Group
26B-Brazil; Group C-other countries in Central/South America not in Groups A or B; Group
D-countries in North America; Group E-ex-English colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa; Group
F-ex-French and ex-Belgian colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa;  Group G-other Sub-Saharan
African countries not in Groups E or F; Group H-Western European countries including
Turkey; Group I-Eastern European (and ex-Soviet Bloc) countries; Group J-Former Soviet
Union countries; Group K-Middle Eastern and Arab North African countries; Group L-
countries of Asia and Oceania (including Australia and New Zealand).
Income Groups
The countries were also divided into the following three income classes for the selection
process, with the classification following that used by the World Bank: High Income, Upper
Middle Income, and all others.
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